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Abstract 
This paper explores the potential role of industrial policy to stimulate post-crisis recovery in 
South East Europe (SEE). Policy reactions in the region have focused on fiscal consolidation 
and austerity, while the design of active industrial policies to improve competitiveness has 
been less in evidence. The paper reviews the experience of industrial policies in the EU and 
shows how these policies have evolved from vertical to horizontal approaches, and how the 
latter versions of policy have been transferred to the accession states in SEE. The paper 
reviews the evolution of industrial policies in eight countries of the region and the impact of 
these policies on industrial production. It argues that the horizontal industrial policies that 
have been imposed on SEE countries through conditionality embodied in the EU accession 
process have left their economies vulnerable to adverse spillovers from the eurozone crisis. It 
concludes with an assessment of the relevance of industrial policies to economic recovery, 
and  questions  whether  SEE  has  been  ‘shut  out’  of  the  ‘fresh’  vertical  industrial  policy  that  has  
been adopted by the EU in recent years. 
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Shut  out?  South  East  Europe  and  the  EU’s  
New Industrial Policy  
 
 
1. Introduction  
Following the global economic crisis, the limitations of unregulated free-
market capitalism have become apparent. The rise of the financial sector as a 
dominant force in many developed economies over the last two decades has 
been accompanied by widespread de-industrialisation and has left these 
economies vulnerable to destructive financial bubbles (Bellamy-Foster and 
Magdoff, 2009). Following the crisis, there has been a loss of confidence in the 
prescriptions of neo-liberal economic thought that prescribed a strong reliance 
on the market and the withdrawal of the state from active intervention in the 
economy to promote industrial development. As yet, however, no alternative 
growth model has been proposed which has won widespread acceptance.  
 
The most recent permutation of the global crisis within the eurozone and its 
periphery has seen the transference of private sector indebtedness to the state, 
leading to soaring budget deficits that have required widespread and 
unpopular cuts in public expenditures (Pisany-Ferry, 2013). Policy reactions 
in EU member states have focused on supporting the financial sector though 
banking union combined with a macro-economic policy package involving 
tight fiscal discipline implemented through the imposition of tough austerity 
packages and strengthened economic governance, while the design of active 
industrial policies to improve competitiveness have been less in evidence. 
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Faced with the need to raise labour productivity and international 
competitiveness so that renewed economic growth could underpin a 
sustained reduction of government deficits, countries in the European 
periphery   are   bereft   of   suitable   policy   instruments   apart   from   ‘internal  
devaluation’.   It   is   in   this   context   that   finding   a   suitable   form   of   industrial  
policy is once again on the agenda promoted by the European Commission, 
which   has   called   for   a   ‘fresh   approach’   to   industrial   policy   as   a   means   to  
promote recovery from the economic crisis in the EU (EC, 2010).  
 
The economies of South East Europe (SEE) have been severely affected by the 
global economic crisis (Bartlett and Prica, 2011) and face similar challenges of 
as the rest of Europe in finding an appropriate policy response1. So far, the 
economic policies that have been adopted in SEE have been broadly 
conservative, being initially stimulative in allowing budget deficits to increase 
from relatively low levels, but subsequently restrictive with deep cuts in 
public expenditure to constrain the emerging deficits (Cviic and Sanfey, 2010). 
The IMF has intervened with conditional loans in the worst affected counties 
such as Bosnia & Herzegovina, Serbia and Romania and more recently in the 
Former   Yugoslav   Republic   of   Macedonia   (henceforth   “Macedonia”).  
Monetary policy was initially loosened in countries that experienced rapid 
reversals of credit growth, such as Croatia, but later tightened where the 
pegged exchange rates were threatened as in the case of Macedonia. These 
difficult economic conditions have continued as a result of spillover from the 
continuing crisis in the Eurozone leading to double-dip recessions in some 
countries. In response, aggressive fiscal austerity policies have been applied 
in   the   ‘super-periphery’   countries   of   SEE   similar   to   those   imposed  on  other 
peripheral countries of the EU (Bartlett and Prica, 2013). However, there has                                                         1 For overviews of the nature and effects of the economic crisis in the region see Anastakis et al. (2011) and Bartlett and Monastiriotis (2011). 
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been no sign of an accompanying renewal of industrial policy as a remedy for 
economic  recession  in  any  of  these  countries  (Cerović  et  al.,  2014). 
 
This paper explores the role of industrial policy as a potential means to 
stimulate economic revival in South East Europe. In the next section, the 
paper reviews how industrial policies in the EU and the USA followed similar 
policy  evolutions  from  a  ‘vertical’  approach  in  the  immediate post-war period 
under   the   Keynesian   consensus,   to   a   ‘horizontal’   approach   in   the   period  
following the Reagan-Thatcher neoliberal ascendancy. Within the class of 
horizontal industrial policies, it distinguishes thos designed to promote 
business networks and industrial clusters from those designed to promote the 
knowledge economy and innovation systems. Section 3 turns to the analysis 
of industrial policy and performance in SEE and argues that the region has 
been driven by the process of Europeanisation to make an equivalent shift 
from vertical to horizontal industrial polices. Sections 4 through 6 detail the 
evolution of industrial policies in each of eight SEE countries, taking in turn 
three groups of countries distinguished by their accession status: new 
member states, candidate states and potential candidates2. Section 7 reviews 
the recent return of EU industrial policy towards a vertical approach through 
the  ‘fresh’  industrial  policy  adopted  at  the  start  of  the  2010s  in  response  to  the  
eurozone crisis.  Section 8 concludes with an assessment of the horizontal 
industrial policies that have been adopted in SEE in recent years, and argues 
that these policies have been incapable of supporting economic recovery in 
which industrial capacity has been diminished by the long years of 
transitional recession and undermined by the horizontal industrial policy that 
they have been obliged to implement as a condition of the EU accession                                                         2 Among EU member states, the countries considered are Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia; among candidate states are Croatia (a candidate until 2013) and Macedonia; and potential candidate states are Bosnia & Herzegovina, Montenegro (a candidate since 2010) and Serbia (a candidate since 2013). 
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process. The section concludes that the SEE countries are likely to be 
effectively “shut  out”  of   the  EU’s   fresh  approach   to   industrial  policy  due   to  
this lack of capacity for high technology industrial production. 
 
 
2.  Industrial Policies in the EU and USA- from Vertical to 
Horizontal  
After the end of the Second World War, most governments in Western Europe 
adopted active industrial polices to stimulate post-war economic recovery. 
Industrial policy was used to direct state support to favoured industries, 
guided by various sorts of planning. The most active proponent of this 
approach was the French government, which adopted a formal planning 
approach   to   support   selected   industrial   sectors   and   build   ‘national  
champions’   (Cohen,  2007).  Governments  also  channelled  development  funds  
into less developed regions, focusing on infrastructure projects and subsidies 
to large-scale industries to support the development of regions in decline.  
 
In   the   late   1980s,   with   the   creation   of   the   EU   Single  Market,   this   ‘vertical’  
industrial policy lost favour as the Reagan-Thatcher economic policies 
emphasised the withdrawal of the state from economic management, the 
privatisation of state owned enterprises, a greater reliance on market forces 
and   the   creation   of   a   business   friendly   ‘investment   climate’   in   which the 
spontaneous forces of the market would decide which industries or sectors 
would  prosper,   and  which  would   fall   by   the  wayside.  The  new   ‘horizontal’  
approach to industrial policy saw a role for the state in supervising an 
enabling environment for business growth, by setting out the rules of the 
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game, ensuring the rule of law, and generally creating a market free of 
preferential subsidies in which all could compete on an equal basis. The old 
idea  of  ‘picking  winners’  from  the  era  of  vertical  industrial  policy was derided 
as infeasible and ineffective and was replaced by a wave of economic 
liberalisation. The new emphasis was on competition policy, which it was 
thought would eliminate or at least significantly reduce state aid to industry, 
and on promoting horizontal measures to establish a level playing field for 
companies across the Single Market.  
 
In the 1990s the focus of such a horizontal industrial policy shifted further 
away from sectoral industrial policies towards decentralised territorial 
policies embodied in the EU regional policy and the activities of the European 
Regional Development Fund (Begg and Mayes, 2000). This emphasised the 
fostering  of  ‘regional  competitiveness’,  and  led  to  the  creation  of  programmes  
of regional development that embodied new formulations of horizontal 
industrial policy such as (i) support for small and medium sized enterprises at 
a local level through the creation of decentralised business networks and 
industrial  clusters  and  (ii)  an  emphasis  on  ‘regional   innovation  systems’,  the  
‘knowledge   economy’   and   ‘knowledge   transfer’   from   public   research   and  
higher education institutions to the business sector (Cooke, 2001). 
 
Business networks and industrial clusters 
 
Business networking and industrial clusters were at the heart of this new 
horizontal industrial policy approach within which small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs) became an increasing focus of attention. Italian industrial 
districts became a paradigm for a new form of economic development based 
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upon a dense networking and clustering of small firms in specific geographic 
locations.  Drawing  on  the  research  evidence  from  the  ‘Third  Italy’  as  well  as  
other regions in which industrial districts had been observed, such as Baden-
Württemberg in Germany, Cooke and Morgan (1993) identified a new 
“network  paradigm”  in  which  the  spatial  dimension  of  inter-firm networking 
was of key importance. Stabher et al. (1995) showed how programmes to 
support business networking had been widely developed as a tool for 
regional industrial policy. Inter-firm networks were also identified as an 
important element for decentralised industrial policy in transition economies 
where rapidly changing economic conditions led to the emergence of new and 
more flexible industrial economies to replace the old obsolete hierarchical 
industrial  structures  (Franičević  and  Bartlett,  2001). 
 
Viewed from a policy perspective, the recognition of the importance of inter-
firm networks and their geographical concentration led to the emergence of 
the notion of industrial clusters as a policy device. If such clusters had been so 
effective in the Third Italy and elsewhere, could governments seeking to 
promote economic growth and development create them artificially? The 
influential work of Michael Porter stimulated an increased policy interest in 
the beneficial effects of industrial clusters, and governments rushed to 
introduce new industrial cluster programmes with subsidies to support them. 
However, few of these initiatives proved to be successful. As Feldman et al. 
(2005) argued, effective clusters are typically created by entrepreneurs as a 
part of their strategic business strategy in response to market incentives. They 
evolve, rather than being the product of conscious design. Nevertheless, 
policy makers in many transition countries have supported the idea of 
clusters, starting with the cluster policy introduced in Slovenia in 2001, and 
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spreading throughout South East Europe through a process of policy transfer 
from international donor organisations and EU assistance programmes. 
 
The knowledge economy and regional innovation systems 
 
The accession of the East European economies to the EU in 2004 led to an 
increased pace of delocalisation in the old member states as industries began 
to transfer from the UK, France and Germany to the new member states in the 
East. This prompted calls for a more coordinated approach to industrial 
policy. In 2005 the European Commission re-launched the Lisbon Agenda as 
the   “Growth   and   Jobs   Strategy”.   The   new   strategy   re-emphasised the 
horizontal approach to industrial policy based on improving competitiveness 
through increased support for innovation. It aimed to increase expenditure on 
R&D to 3% of EU GDP, promote the uptake of Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICT) and develop innovation poles linking 
regional centres, universities and businesses.  
 
The new emphasis by the Commission on innovation and the knowledge 
economy chimed with the voluminous academic research into regional 
innovation systems. This had argued that differences in innovative capacities 
between  countries  and  regions  are  linked  to  the  ‘thickness’  of  institutions  that  
promote learning and the transfer of technology (Morgan, 1997). Porter (2000) 
argued that industrial clusters would benefit from knowledge transfer from 
local universities. Policy makers began to support programmes to facilitate 
links between high technology companies and institutions of higher 
education. Universities were encouraged to set up programmes to enable 
academics and students to establish high-tech spin-off companies to 
Will Bartlett 
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commercialise the results of their scientific inventions. Yet the use of spin-offs 
as a mechanism of knowledge transfer is not without its drawbacks and 
difficulties. Evidence from several studies showed that only a minority of 
spin-offs could be expected to have growth potential (Druilhe and Garnsey, 
2004), while in the absence of adequate support spin-offs may remain stuck at 
a too small scale of operation (Degroof and Roberts, 2004). Moreover, spin-
offs may find it hard to raise either outside equity capital or loan funds to 
finance their activities (Lerner, 2004) and they typically lack the managerial 
expertise needed to exploit the commercial potential of their technologies 
(Wright et al., 2004).  
 
Spin-off companies are often located in science or technology parks based 
either within or close to a university or research institute. Some early 
empirical evidence suggested that the level of interaction between firms in 
such science and technology parks and their local universities is generally low 
(Massey et al., 1992). Cooperation between firms in a park may also be less 
than one might expect (Quintas et al., 1992; Johanisson, 1998), which may be 
due to the heterogeneity of the firms in a Park (Lowengren-Williams, 2000). 
Nevertheless, interactions between park-based companies may be greater 
than among other firms (Felsenstein, 1994). Lindelöf and Löfsten carried out 
an empirical study of 265 new technology firms in ten science parks in 
Sweden, and compared these with a matched sample of off-park firms. They 
found stronger links to universities, higher levels of technological innovation, 
and higher rates of growth in firms located in parks compared to off-park 
firms.  
 
Such decentralised industrial policies were not confined to Europe, but were 
also adopted in the USA. Shrank (2009) shows how industrial policy in the 
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USA has become highly decentralised, reflecting the emergence of a new, 
networked economy. US industrial policy is now delivered through 
institutions such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and 
the Small Business Administration (SBA).  The SBA provides Small Business 
Innovation Research (SBIR) grants allocated on a decentralised and 
competitive basis. The Advanced Research Projects Agency brokers the 
relationship between scientists, engineers, and entrepreneurs to foster the 
growth of new firms and industries. According to Shrank, over the last three 
decades the USA has been transformed from  the  virtual  archetype  of  a  ‘liberal  
market   economy’   into   an   increasingly   enthusiastic  practitioner  of  horizontal  
industrial policy, based on the principles of experimentation, diversity and 
local knowledge. Under the SBIR programme, public institutions must 
allocate 2.5% of their R&D funds to small businesses through competitive 
awards. During the 2000s, the SBA allocated grants to 1,500 firms, fostering 
cooperation between research institutions and the small business sector on a 
decentralised basis. The view that the USA implements effective industrial 
policies is echoed by Ketels (2007) who demonstrates the effectiveness of 
decentralised industrial policies in the areas of science and technology, local 
economic development and trade supporting policies, despite the lack of an 
overall strategy. 
 
It  should  not  be  thought,  however,  that  the  ‘horizontal’  approach  to  industrial  
policy in the EU was adopted on the basis of unanimous approval by all the 
Member States (Trouille, 2007). France and Germany in particular were 
dissatisfied with the horizontal approach to industrial policy and have 
continued to implement their own versions of industrial policy, with France 
in   particular   continuing   to   pursue   ‘vertical’   policies   of   supporting   ‘national  
Will Bartlett 
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champions’.3 However, they were unable to influence the emerging new EU 
policy approach that had been captured by the dominance of neo-liberal 
arguments that had been pushed hard by the UK in particular (Smith 2005). It 
was this more liberal market interpretation of industrial policy that was 
transferred to East European accession countries as part of the conditionality 
of the accession process. In the more advanced transition economies in 
Central Europe and the Baltic states this approach chimed well with their 
market-oriented policies adopted during the post-communist transition, but 
in South East Europe the liberal policy approach was less favoured and state 
intervention in the economy persisted for longer. 
 
 
3. The Europeanisation of industrial policy in South East 
Europe 
 
This section argues that industrial policies in South East Europe followed a 
similar pattern of evolution, from vertical to horizontal, that has been 
observed in the developed market economies, although with some delay. The 
countries of South East Europe became highly industrialised under the 
communist system, to an extent greater than was justified by their level of 
economic development. However, with the onset of transition to a market 
economy in the 1990s the industrial base of these countries collapsed. This 
was a common phenomenon of the transitional recession and restructuring 
that affected all transition countries, but was far more emphasised in South 
East Europe following the break-up of former Yugoslavia and the wars and                                                         3 Trouille	   (2007:	   518)	   cites	   the	   French	   Beffa	   Report	   “For	   a	   Renewed	   Industrial	   Policy”	   as	  advocating industrial policies focused on large-scale programmes in high-tech industries, and notes that the report has been criticised for relying on	  ‘old	  French	  recipes’	  inspired	  by	  de	  Gaulle’s	  vision of grand projects from the 1960s. 
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conflicts that affected the whole region either directly or indirectly. In 
addition, international assistance, and the transfer of policy ideas that came 
with it, emphasised the importance of withdrawing the state from an 
interventionist role in supporting the economy. Conditionality related to the 
EU accession process emphasised the creation of competitive economies 
through a sharp reduction of state aid to industries. As a consequence of this 
conditionality, a process of Europeanisation of industrial policy has gradually 
taken place, even in countries that are not currently candidate states. 
 
Some countries tried to resist these trends, and the pace of privatisation and 
marketisation has indeed been slower in South East Europe (SEE) than in the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Baltic. Privatisation 
was adopted gradually and hesitatingly, and state aid to industries in the 
form of subsidies with the aim of preserving employment was widespread 
(Hare and Hughes 1992). Countries as diverse as Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia 
and Slovenia followed a gradualist approach to privatisation. In the view of 
the former Slovenian Minister of Economy, Tea Petrin, privatisation on its 
own was unlikely to promote economic growth in the absence of an industrial 
policy to guide the replacement of the old industrial structures in small 
transition   economies   (Petrin,   1996).   Slovenia’s   gradualist   approach   led   to  
eventually   to   the   creation   of   a   “corporatist”   variety   of   capitalism   (Luksić,  
2003). In Croatia too, after an initial burst of enthusiasm in the early 1990s, the 
completion of privatisation was delayed. The restructuring and privatisation 
of the shipbuilding industry became a critical issue in relation to the 
completion of EU accession negotiations. The shipbuilding industry had been 
kept alive only by a continuous injection of subsidies in response to the 
political pressure from local interest groups and in consideration of the 
serious impact on employment that would result from letting this industry 
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collapse. The industry was eventually privatised only in the final months 
preceding  Croatia’s  accession  to  the  EU  in  July  2013.  Serbia  also  resisted  the  
effective implementation of transition policies until the democratic turn in 
2000. Elsewhere in the region the neoliberal perspective was taken on board 
more readily. Countries such as Albania and Macedonia had completed the 
privatisation process by the late 1990s and adopted a liberal market variety of 
capitalism (Bartlett, 2007), as did Montenegro in the 2000s.  
 
Despite these differences, the influence of the EU accession process has 
eventually become a decisive factor, as industrial policy has formed one of the 
negotiating   ‘chapters’   of   the  acquis  which  must  be   taken  on  by  aspiring  EU  
members as a requirement of the accession process. Thus, in the early 2000s, 
the new EU member states (Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania) adopted the 
horizontal industrial policy measures mandated by the EU, while the 
candidate states soon followed suit (Croatia, Macedonia). In contrast, Serbia4 
and Bosnia Herzegovina have retained a more interventionist approach, with 
large subsidies to specific industries, accompanied by protection of 
monopolistic interests through tariff and non-tariff protection policies. Even 
in those countries, measures implementing EU-style policies through the 
creation of tax-privileged industrial zones and regional development agencies 
to   support   the   development   of   SMEs   have   been   funded   through   the   EU’s  
assistance programme (IPA – Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance). 
 
Thus, from about mid-2000 onwards, almost all SEE countries were 
vigorously pursuing market-friendly economic policies. Privatisation was 
completed in Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia in the run up to or shortly                                                         4 Serbia became a candidate for EU membership in March 2012, and opened negotiations for membership in January 2014 
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following accession in 2004, and in Croatia in 2013. Economic growth was led 
by an expansion of the services sector together with the liberalisation of 
capital markets and the ensuing rapid growth of foreign credits. 
 
Trends in industrial performance 
 
By the end of the 1990s, the region had witnessed a sharp reduction in the 
share of output produced and workers employed by the industrial sector 
(Bartlett, 2009). As shown in Figure 1, the share of industry in gross value 
added (GVA) continued to fall in most countries of South East Europe 
(Croatia, Romania, Serbia) during the period of economic growth that took 
place in the early 2000s, with the exception was Bulgaria where the share of 
industry in GVA increased by two percentage points following EU accession 
from 2004 to 2007. This general fall in the share of industrial production 
followed the EU trend and reflected the rapid growth in services sectors 
during this period.  
 
Following the onset of the period of economic crisis from 2008, the share of 
industry tended to rise in all these countries as output fell or stagnated; the 
crisis has apparently affected the agriculture and services sectors more 
seriously than the industrial sector. Almost all the countries represented in 
Figure 1 (the only SEE countries for which data is available) maintained a 
share of industry in GVA above the average for the EU-27. The exceptions 
have been Macedonia and Montenegro. In the former case, the share of 
industry in GVA fell during the recession, reaching levels below the EU 
average in 2012 although most likely recovering in 2013. In Montenegro, the 
manufacturing sector had been hollowed out in the 1990s and early 2000s 
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with the early adoption of a neoliberal economic policy that exposed the 
wood manufacturing industry in the North East of the country to exceptional 
external  competition,   leading   to   its   rapid  demise   (Bartlett  and  Šišević,  2013).  
Its share of industrial production in GVA is therefore far below that of other 
countries of the region and has fallen further in recent years. 
 
Figure 1: Industry share in GVA (%) 
 Source: Eurostat online data on share of industry (except construction) in gross value added, variable name [nama_nace10_c] 
 
Over the last decade, the share of manufacturing sector share in GVA has 
followed a similar path to that of industrial production. In Croatia and Serbia 
the share of manufacturing followed the long-term secular decline of 
manufacturing in the EU-27 rather closely5. Only Romania maintained a 
significantly higher share of manufacturing in GVA at 23.5% over the period 
from 2004-2013.                                                          5 The share of manufacturing in gross vale added in the EU-27 fell monotonically from 17.4% to 15.2% between 2002 and 2012. In Croatia the share of manufacturing in gross value added fell from16.8% to 18.3% and in Serbia from 19.0% to 17.1% over the same period. 
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As shown above, a main element of the horizontal approach to industrial 
policy has been its focus on increasing the innovative capacity of the 
economy, and on support for high-growth innovative small and medium 
sized enterprises (SMEs) which it has been argued have played an important 
role in underpinning economic growth in transition countries (Radosevic, 
2002).  
 
Figure 2: Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% GDP) 
 Source: Eurostat online data, Total intramural R&D expenditure (GERD) by sectors of performance variable code name [rd_e_gerdtot]. 
 
An influential argument developed by Radosevic (2004) and others is that 
while growth in the early stages of transition depended on a reallocation of 
resources from large low-productivity state firms to higher productivity firms 
in the emerging private sector, improvements in economic growth in later 
phases of transition depend on the pace of innovation and the development of 
a knowledge-based economy. Yet, state expenditure on R&D in the transition 
economies of SEE has been systematically below the average in the EU (see 
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
EU-27 Bulgaria Croatia Romania Slovenia
Will Bartlett 
   16 
Figure 2). Significant differences in gross expenditure on research and 
development as a proportion of GDP (GERD) can be observed between 
countries. Only Slovenia has caught up with the EU average GERD ratio of 
around 2% since accession in 2004, and subsequently surpassed the EU 
average. Slovenia has adopted a supportive and long-term set of policy 
instruments to support innovation, with greater focus than in most other 
countries of SEE  (Bartlett  and  Bukvič,  2006,  OECD,  2013).  In  Croatia,  where  a  
less conscious policy focus on innovation has characterised policymaking 
(Bartlett  and  Čučković,  2006)  the  GERD  ratio  has  fallen  over  time  towards  the  
far lower levels typical in Bulgaria and Romania, where it has hovered 
around just 0.5% over the last decade. 
 
 
4. Industrial Policy in the EU Member States in SEE  
Slovenia 
 
As   in  other   transition   countries   in  SEE   in   the   first  wave  of   the  EU’s  Eastern  
enlargement, Slovenia adopted a gradualist approach to privatisation. Even at 
the point of accession to the EU in 2004, the main state owned banks had not 
been privatised. In fact, privatisation in Slovenia resulted perversely in 
greater state control, since most firms allegedly privatised were bought out by 
state funds and by state-sponsored privatisation investment funds (Pahor et 
al., 2004). In the run-up to EU accession, the Slovenian policy changed to a 
greater emphasis on horizontal industrial policies and the removal of 
subsidies and state aids   for   industry   in  keeping  with   the  EU  acquis   (Šuštar,  
2004).  On  the  eve  of  accession,  the  EU’s  Comprehensive  Monitoring  Report  on  
Slovenia recommended the termination of the Slovenian Development 
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Corporation, the body that owned state companies, as its main 
recommendation on the Chapter on Industrial Policy (EC, 2003).  
 
Slovenia has also been an exception to the general early avoidance of 
horizontal industrial policy (Bartlett, 2000). Early in the transition process, 
Slovenia established a number of measures designed to support local 
economic development by supporting SMEs with interest rate subsidies and 
other supportive measures.6 The Slovenes were influenced by the example of 
the successful Italian experience with industrial districts that demonstrated 
the potential for economic development based on local networks of small 
firms, which had been an important element of regional industrial policy in 
the Veneto and Emilia Romagna. The aim of this policy was to preserve the 
old established industrial base while establishing a core of high- growth SMEs 
that would generate high quality jobs (in terms of value added per worker).  
The focus of the policy was on the search for potentially fast growth firms that 
could be supported by the state through the main SME agency: the Small 
Business Development Centre. 
 
In keeping with the horizontal approach to industrial policy, Slovenia 
adopted a programme for developing industrial clusters involving companies 
and research institutes, beginning with a pilot programme in 2000-2003 
(Palčič  et  al.,  2010).  One  of  the  aims  was  to  promote  knowledge  transfer  from  
research institutes to the companies in the clusters. The programme provided 
co-financing for the costs of the initial phase of creation of clusters, for the 
preparation of a joint development strategy, and for the costs incurred during 
the first two years of their operations. Industrial policy focused on support for                                                         6 Even before independence in 1991, within the former Yugoslavia, Slovenia had taken a leading role in a country-wide initiative to establish support centres for small firms. 
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small firm clusters and networks, through a decentralised system of support 
for innovation using technology parks and university-sponsored spin-offs 
(Bartlett  and  Bukvič,  2006). 
 
Bulgaria 
 
Bulgaria had a legacy of investment in high tech industries from the 
communist era when it specialised in computer industries. Although the large 
firms mainly collapsed in the 1990s, a significant number of high tech SMEs 
emerged with some support from the state (Bartlett and Rangelova, 1996). By 
the time of its accession to the EU in 2007, state support had been withdrawn 
from most sectors of the economy as Bulgaria complied with the EU accession 
criteria. According to the final regular annual report in 2005   Bulgaria’s  
industrial strategy broadly complied with the principles of European 
horizontal industrial policy. The privatisation and restructuring process had 
moved forward and Bulgaria had improved the business environment, 
consolidated the banking sector and attracted foreign investment. However, 
in order to complete its preparations for accession, Bulgaria was requested to 
continue to develop a horizontal industrial policy designed to promote 
innovation and strengthen economic competitiveness, complete its 
privatisation strategy and the restructure the steel industry. The share of 
sectoral state aid in industry fell from 0.11% of GDP in 2004 to 0.03% in 2006 
just before accession.7  EU industrial policy, to which Bulgaria was asked to 
conform, was limited to enhancing the competitiveness of enterprises in 
general, promoting an environment conducive to entrepreneurship and the 
creation of SMEs, and to exploiting the industrial potential of innovation, 
research and technological development. By 2011, Bulgarian industrial policy                                                         7 Eurostat data on state aid by type of aid 
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was fully in line with the EU industrial policy approach. This was neatly 
summarised in the National Reform Programme document for 2010-1013 
adopted in April 2011: 
 
“The   government   policy  will   [support]   research   and   development   of  
innovations by businesses, acceleration of knowledge transfer towards 
them through development of high-technology parks and 
technological incubators, centres for transfer of technologies, etc. 
Assistance is also envisaged for innovation networks, for establishing 
or   expanding   the   operations   of   networks   of   ‘business   angels’   in  
Bulgaria. Considerable efforts will be made for the promotion of 
clusters and regional business incubators development with a view to 
increasing   the   efficiency   of   enterprises’   production and market 
performance. With a view to increasing their competitiveness, the 
enterprises will be supported in the process of technological 
modernisation and introduction of internationally-recognised 
standards.”8 
 
Romania 
                                                                                                                                       
In Romania, in the run up to EU accession industrial policy became gradually 
oriented towards horizontal industrial policies. State aids to the 
manufacturing sector fell from 52% of national state aid expenditure in 2002 
to just 15% of total expenditures in 2006. Moreover total state aid expenditure 
fell from 2.6% of GDP in 2004 to just 0.7% in 2006 (GOR 2008: 87). At the same 
time the amount of state aid devoted to horizontal objectives increased to                                                         8 “Republic	   of	   Bulgaria:	   National	   Reform	   Programme	   2010-1013, in Implementation of the 
Europe	  2020	  Strategy”,	  Sofia:	  Ministry	  of	  Finance 
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80.5% of national state aid expenditure by 2006, up significantly from the 
63.8% achieved in 2004. The share of state aids with a sectoral target 
correspondingly diminished, in line with EU policy on reducing state aids to 
industry. 
 
Table 1: National state aids for manufacturing industries in Romania 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
National	  State	  Aid	  (€m)	  (a) 859.3 918.4 1,607.0 639.3 691.8 
Manufacturing (%) (a) 51.9 33.9 46.9 15.0 15.0 
Sectoral state aid % GDP (b) 0.95 1.08 1.67 0.48 0.57 
Source: (a) GOR (2008), Annex 4 (b) Eurostat 
 
As one of the priority measures for implementing horizontal polices, the 
government launched a National Strategy for Research, Development and 
Innovation (RDI) for the period 2007-2013, which called for a strong 
promotion of scientific research, technological development and innovation. 
The aim was to increase public funds for research from 0.5% of GDP in 2007 
to 1% of GDP by 2010. Other measures involved improved regulation to 
support investments, facilitate enterprise entry and exit, improve the 
participation of SMEs in public procurement, develop business infrastructure, 
and increase enterprise competitiveness. Of particular importance was a set of 
measures designed to increase enterprise competitiveness that involved large-
scale investments in modernisation and regional development, of which 
€1.7m  was  provided  for  financing  investments  in  SMEs,  €401.7m  for  financing  
large  investment  projects,  and  €50m  for  regional  development.   
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Industrial performance in the NMS 
 
Indices of industrial production for the three SEE countries that became EU 
member states in 2004 are shown in Figure 3. They cover the period 2000-
2013. In all three countries, industrial production expanded continuously up 
to the onset of the economic crisis in 2008. Romanian industrial production 
took off following accession in 2004, whereas in Bulgaria and Slovenia, 
industrial production had been increasing for several years before. Following 
the onset of the crisis, industrial production levelled off in 2008 in all three 
countries, and then declined precipitously in 2009. Industrial production has 
recovered above pre-crisis levels only in Romania. Interestingly, Slovenia has 
one of the sharpest declines in industrial production in 2009 and the slowest 
recovery of the three countries, despite its investment and efforts in 
innovation expenditure.  
 
How can these divergent patterns be explained? The rapid increase in 
industrial production prior to the 2004 accession in Bulgaria and Slovenia, 
supported by a high level of state aid to industry, seems to vindicate the 
gradualist approach to transition to the market economy that these countries 
followed. The Romanian case points in the opposite direction, with industrial 
growth only taking off after accession and after the abandonment of the state 
aid approach. After the accession the Romanian industrial sector recovered 
more strongly than the other countries, despite the feeble impact of the 
national strategy for research and development on expenditure on innovation 
activities. A clue may be found in the nature of the recovery of Romanian 
industrial production, which was driven mainly by an increase in low-
technology manufacturing. Data from Eurostat reveal that the index of low-
technology industrial production reached 116.9 in 2013 (an increase of almost 
Will Bartlett 
   22 
17%compared to the base year 2010=100), while the index of high technology 
industrial production reached only 104.6 (an increase of just 4.6%).9 The 
strongest growing industrial subsector was repair and installation of 
industrial machinery, which expanded by more than 50% between 2010 and 
201310. The Renault-owned Dacia car factory in Romania has partially led the 
industrial recovery with production of low-tech cheap cars.11 
 
Figure 3: Industrial production indices: New Member States in SEE (Bulgaria, 
Romania, Slovenia) compared to EU-27 
 Source: Eurostat online data, industrial production index (2010=100), variable code name [sts_inpr_a] Data refer to NACE Revision 2.0, Mining and quarrying; manufacturing; electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply (data do not include construction)  
In contrast, in Bulgaria the index of high-technology industrial production 
reached 128.6 in 2013 (an increase of almost 29% compared to 2010), but the 
                                                        9 Eurostat online data on industrial production, variable code name [sts_inpr_a]. 10 The 2013 index value for this sector was 153.65 (compared to the 2010=100 base) 11 See for example the report by Bloomberg news: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09-11/europe-s-cheapest-cars-reviving-romania-as-dacia-thrives.html. The Romanian industrial production index for vehicle production shows an increase of 33% between 2010 and 2013. 
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low share of such high-technology production inhibited this sector from 
driving a general industrial recovery.  
 
5. Industrial Policy in EU Candidate States 
 
Croatia12 
 
Before EU accession in 2013 Croatia had pursued an active vertical industrial 
policy through the state development bank HBOR. When the growth of 
domestic credit fell sharply in 2009, lending to the corporate sector increased 
by 2.0%, while lending to households fell, taking the brunt of the decline in 
credit. Almost half of the increase in corporate loans was related to the 
government's programme to stimulate corporate financing through the 
HBOR. Moreover, the Privatisation Fund continued to hold a stake in 768 
companies, with a majority holding in 79 of them. According to the European 
Commission’s  Report,   in  2010   ‘overall,  very  limited  progress  has been made 
towards  reducing  the  large  role  of  the  state  in  the  economy’.13 Yet, alongside 
the traditional vertical industrial policy, Croatia also began to develop a 
horizontal approach. The Croatian Agency for Small Business (HAMAG) was 
established in 2003 as a state agency aiming to develop the SME 
infrastructure, including regional development agencies, incubators, 
industrial parks and technology parks. In one active interventionist 
programme, HAMAG subsidised vouchers for consultancy services for SMEs 
in the amount of 50% with a budget of HRK 1 million per year. The main goal 
of HAMAG has been to work locally and regionally. Contracts were signed                                                         12 Croatia acceded to the EU in July 20913, but during the period of the analysis presented here was a Candidate State 13 EC (2010) Croatia 2010 Progress Report, SEC(2010) 1326, Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, p. 23 
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with local partner institutions such as RDAs, who managed the voucher 
scheme. The SMEs who approached the partner institutions for consultancy 
service were offered a choice of certified consultants. In addition, subsidised 
credit lines for local SMEs were provided by the State in a programme 
delivered through local banks. The credits, with a ten-year payback period, 
carried an interest rate subsidy of 2% from the State and a further 2% from the 
County, disbursed by local commissions, whose membership consisted of 
representatives from the Ministry of Economy, the County, the local bank, 
and the Chamber of Commerce. Other initiatives were developed at local 
level, such as in the town of Split, which had its own programme for SME 
development focusing on the crafts sector. Similar local programmes were 
developed in other towns and counties. 
 
The Europeanisation of Croatian industrial policy was much in evidence as 
the pre-accession  process  gathered  pace  (Čučković  and  Bartlett,  2007).  Croatia  
gradually adopted the EU acquis on competition, establishing the Croatian 
Competition Agency (CCA) in 2009. The CCA issued 18 decisions on anti-
trust and merger cases in its first year of operation, as well as resolving 23 
cases of state aid in line with the acquis. The CCA was also in charge of the 
sensitive issue of restructuring and privatising the Croatian shipyards, the 
tendering procedure for which was completed in May 2010. The privatisation 
of shipbuilding was a key element in the completion of the accession 
negotiations. The stipulations on enterprise and industrial policy (Chapter 20) 
related mainly to support for SMEs and alignment with the Small Business 
Act for Europe. In relation to industrial policy, the EC 2010 Progress Report 
noted that measures had been taken to address the impact of the economic 
crisis through the Economic Recovery Programme introduced in April 2010, 
which included measures to improve the business environment and create a 
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competitive   economy.   The   Report   also   approvingly   referred   to   Croatia’s  
active participation in the EU Competitiveness and Innovation Programme 
and the Europe Enterprise Network.  
 
Several horizontal measures were introduced in line with the EU industrial 
policy approach. A "Strategy for the Development of Science in the Republic 
of Croatia in the 21st Century" was adopted, and the government developed 
programmes to enhance cooperation between research institutes and 
universities and the business sector. A business innovation network (BICRO) 
was established which was designed to link innovative enterprises, research 
institutions, and universities in an attempt to stimulate knowledge transfer 
and promote innovative activity. A set of institutions similar to those in 
Slovenia was developed to facilitate knowledge transfer and the start up and 
growth of high technology industries including incubators, technology parks 
and technology centres, and a programme to stimulate the formation of 
technology clusters was implemented. By 2010, as many as 138 
entrepreneurial zones had been established. 
 
Macedonia 
 
The recent approach Industrial policy in Macedonia has been developed 
almost exactly in line with the EU horizontal approach, clearly influenced by 
the EU pre-accession process. The industrial policy of Macedonia (MoE 2009) 
aims to attract FDI, promote research and development and innovation, 
develop eco-friendly technologies and products, promote SME development 
and entrepreneurship, and develop clusters and networks. The adopted 
measures are designed to support applied research, development and 
innovation in industry, stimulate knowledge transfer between universities 
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and industry, stimulate the commercialisation of new products and services 
in the field of product design, support industry in employing researchers, 
stimulate transfer of technology, create technological industrial zones, protect 
intellectual property rights, and develop an integrated innovation policy 
(MoE 2009: 32-33).  The  policy  document  states  quite  bluntly  that  “the  policy  is  
horizontal  in  its  nature  and  does  not  focus  on  supporting  selected  industries”  
(MoE 2009: 6). The vision of the policy is to encourage the production of 
higher value-added products and services based on knowledge, innovation 
and collaboration. However, it also identifies organic wine and foods, eco-
steel, eco-friendly construction, ITC, specialised electronic parts, renewable 
energy production, creative industries, medical equipment and service, 
authentic tourism and other industries as part of the vision for development 
by 2020. Quite how these aspirations are to be met without specific sectoral 
measures to promote them was left suitably vague. 
 
As EU-compatible laws have gradually been introduced, the business 
environment for SMEs has improved. In 2014 the country was ranked 25th of 
189  countries   in   the  World  Bank   `ease  of  doing  business’   index,  making   the  
country the highest ranked in the region. The time required to register a 
business has been reduced to three days at relatively low costs, with no 
minimum capital requirement, making the country the seventh ranked for 
starting a business. Between 2013 and 2014 the country improved its ranking 
for  “getting  electricity”  from  109th  position  to  76th  and  “getting  credit”  from  
24th position to 3rd position. 
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Industrial performance in the Candidate States 
 
Industrial production in Croatia and Macedonia grew steadily from 2000 to 
2008. In common with other countries in the region, the industrial sector 
experienced a sharp downturn in 2009. After the onset of the economic crisis 
industrial production in Croatia has fallen steadily and in 2013 reached the 
level attained a decade earlier. In Macedonia industrial production began to 
recover in 2010, although it has still not reached its pre-crisis peak. 
Nevertheless, Macedonia is the only country in the region in which 
unemployment has begun to fall since the onset of the crisis, albeit from 
extremely high levels.  
 
The differences in post-crisis performance of the industrial sectors in the two 
countries are striking. As discussed above, Croatia maintained an active 
industrial policy approach in the period before her EU accession, maintaining 
a significant state holding in many industries. She supported SMEs through 
subsidised interest rates at county level through HAMAG, and continued to 
provide subsidies to preserve the shipbuilding and other strategic industries. 
Overall the Croatian approach brought about a strong improvement in 
manufacturing performance before the onset of the crisis, although other 
factors such as the Free Trade Agreements and CEFTA regional free trade 
area as well as many other factors undoubtedly played a role in contributing 
to the differences in performance between the two countries. After the 
recession hit, Croatian industrial performance faltered. As state aids were 
gradually withdrawn in the years immediately preceding accession in 2013, 
the industrial sector lost state support and continued to decline.  
 
Will Bartlett 
   28 
Figure 4: Industrial production indices: Candidate countries Croatia and 
Macedonia compared to EU-27 (2010=100) 
 Source: Eurostat online data, industrial production index (2010=100), variable code name [sts_inpr_a] Data refer to NACE Revision 2.0, Mining and quarrying; manufacturing; electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply (data do not include construction)  
In contrast, a different approach to industrial policy had been adopted in 
Macedonia based upon neoliberal policy principles, with the full completion 
of the privatisation of the industrial sector taking place in the late 1990s. 
Macedonia became a candidate country in 2005 and quickly adopted EU 
horizontal industrial policy measures, based upon support for SMEs and a 
raft of horizontal measures. Up to 2008 the policy yielded some dividends 
with a rapid growth of industrial production from a very low base occurring 
from 2005 to 2008 (see Figure 4). As in other countries in the region, the 
economic crisis brought about a decline in industrial production from 2008-
2010 but thereafter a recovery took place that has lifted industrial production 
partly back to its pre-crisis peak. Instrumental in this performance has been 
the creation of a number of tax-free industrial ones that have supported an 
inflow of foreign direct investment into the country on the basis of large 
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targeted subsidies. Johnson Controls was the first company to invest in the 
Technological-Industrial Development Zone in Skopje, with a US$40 million 
plant to assemble electronic dashboard components. Other investors have 
followed, moving into the industrial zones and creating a significant number 
of new jobs. 
 
 
6.   Industrial  Policy  in  Potential   (and  New)  EU  Candidate  
States 
 
Serbia  
 
The industrial policy adopted in Serbia from 2000-2010 overturned the policy 
of the previous regime, which had given large subsidies to enterprises in 
order to maintain employment. The new approach involved the privatization 
and restructuring of the economy, attraction of FDI, creation of a competitive 
business environment, and the strengthening of the entrepreneurial sector. 
However, state aid continued to be offered to the industry sector despite the 
broad orientation towards pro-market transition policies, and it has even 
increased in recent years.   
 
Table 2: State aid to industry in Serbia (excluding transport, agriculture and 
fisheries) (% GDP)  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 EU-27 Share of GDP 2.4% 2.1% 1.0% 1.4% 1.7% 1.5% 2.0% 0.42% Source: Report on State Aid Granted in the Republic of Serbia in 2009, Belgrade: Ministry of Finance 
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State aid to industry as a share of GDP was reduced by more than half 
between 2003 and 2005, but subsequently crept back up as the pace of 
transition reforms slackened. State aid to industry was 2% of GDP in 2009, 
more than four times as high as the average for the EU-27 (which was 0.42%). 
However, within the total, the share of horizontal measures has been 
increasing while the share of sectoral state aid has been reduced (from 19.5% 
of the total in 2007 to 17.3% in 2009). A new Law on State Aid Control was 
adopted in July 2009, in line with EU principles, following the signing of the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement in July 2008, which carries 
stipulations regulating the granting of state aid. 
 
The industrial policy for 2011-2020 is strongly oriented to EU style horizontal 
measures (Jakopin, 2011). It focuses on sustainable industrial growth and 
development, institution building, improved investment climate; 
strengthening of competitiveness, faster development of entrepreneurship, 
increased and restructured export, reforms of the educational system in line 
with needs of the economy, active and dynamic cooperation between science 
and industry, stimulation of innovation, development of regional industrial 
centres and regional business infrastructure. All of this is in line with the EU 
horizontal approach to industrial policy. Nevertheless, the EC 2010 Report on 
Serbia   stated   that   “Serbia   has   made   little   progress   in developing and 
implementing a modern industrial policy. The industrial strategy remains to 
be  adopted.” 
 
At local level, several municipalities have established business zones that 
compete against one another for outside investors by offering a range of 
incentives and subsidies to attract both domestic and foreign businesses 
(Avlijaš   and   Bartlett,   2011).   To   take   one   example,   at   a   newly   established  
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enterprise zone in the municipality of Svilajnac south of Belgrade, companies 
are provided with business spaces that are rent-free for 99 years, and free of 
tax for 3 years. Outside investors receive an employment subsidy from the 
National Employment Service and are required to employ at least half their 
workforce from the local population. The enterprise zone is mainly funded by 
the Ministry of Economy on a competitive basis through the National 
Investment Plan. It is expected that the zone will employ 1,000 people, of 
which  500  will  be  unskilled  workers  from  the  local  area.    Avlijaš  and  Bartlett  
(2011) observed three agricultural businesses in the zone, two of which were 
in foreign ownership producing processed cucumber, gherkins, and herbs, 
and one in domestic ownership, producing meat products. A German 
company produced plastic companents for the motor industry, while an 
Austrian company produced train tracks. Other municipalities have created 
similar enterprise zones. 
 
Bosnia & Herzegovina  
Under the socialist system in former Yugoslavia, Bosnia & Herzegovina had 
established a significant industrial base around heavy industries (steel and 
aluminium) and defence industries. Twelve large enterprises produced 35% 
of GDP, four of which generated more than two-fifths of total exports (Bartlett 
et al., 2012). As opposed to other republics of former Yugoslavia, Bosnia & 
Herzegovina did not have a strong public R&D structure; the main carriers of 
R&D were industrial institutes. Unfortunately, most of these assets (in higher 
education, research and industry) collapsed during the 1992-1995 war in 
Bosnia. Many researchers from the industrial laboratories and universities 
migrated to foreign countries. 
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Bosnia & Herzegovina now has little in the way of industrial policy and co-
operation between universities and companies in terms of innovation and 
technology transfer is at a very low level. Some regionally based technology 
centres have been set up with donor-support. For example, an innovation 
centre was established in Zenica in 2008 at the University, while the city of 
Zenica a Business and Innovation Technology Park operates in cooperation 
with the University of Tuzla and Tuzla Municipality (ERAWATCH, 2014). 
Other similar centres have been established in Mostar (INTERA Technology 
Park) and the Technology Park in Zenica. In 2010 an innovation centre was 
established in Banja Luka, and property for a technology park was purchased 
in 2013. The idea of developing a technology park in Sarajevo appear to have 
been forgotten, even though Sarajevo has the largest number of faculties, 
institutes and donor organizations. 
 
Montenegro 
 
Montenegro has been a prime example of the pursuit of the neoliberal agenda, 
adopting a free trade policy in 2000 that opened the country to unrestricted 
imports and led to a rapid process of de-industrialisation. The consequence of 
the privatisation policy and the reduction of the role of the state has led to a 
dramatic reduction in the share of industry in GDP, and an increase in the 
share of employment in the services sector, including business services, 
finance and tourism, but predominantly retail and wholesale trade. It is hard 
to see that this strategy can lead to long run sustainable growth, and is likely 
to lead to a situation in which the economic growth of the country is highly 
dependent on the growth of the core economies of the EU. 
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Industrial performance in the Potential (and new) Candidates 
 
Industrial production in the potential and new candidate countries has been 
far more sluggish than in the EU Member States and Candidate States. 
Industrial production in Serbia increased from 2003 to 2008 following the first 
wave of privatisation in the early 2000s (see Figure 5). However, the industrial 
production fell back to previous levels of the early 2000s following the 
economic crisis and has not recovered significantly since then. 
 
Figure 5: Industrial production indices: Potential (and new) Candidates, Bosnia & 
Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia (2010=100) 
 Source: Eurostat online data, industrial production index (2010=100), variable code name [sts_inpr_a] Data refer to NACE Revision 2.0, Mining and quarrying; manufacturing; electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply (data do not include construction)  
A similar picture can be seen in Bosnia & Herzegovina, with the economic 
crisis bringing about a stagnation of industrial production. The collapse of 
industry in Montenegro, associated with the neoliberal policy adopted by the 
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government in the 1990s and the unilateral dismantling of tariff protection of 
domestic industry, inhibited the recovery of industry following the crisis in 
2009. Industrial production fell from an index value of 125.6 in 2008 to a value 
of 85.1 in 2009. The collapse of the wood and forestry industries in the North 
East of the country has not been addressed by an appropriate policy of 
industrial regeneration. 
 
 
7. The   New   European   Industrial   Policy:   What   role   for  
South  East  Europe? 
 
Over the last decade, anxieties about the relative underperformance of 
European businesses in future technologies led to calls for a more 
interventionist industrial policy (Trouille, 2007). The recent global economic 
crisis, especially, has led to a rethink, with the German position being 
strengthened by its success in leading the EU out of the recession caused by 
the dominance of financial capital associated with the Anglo-Saxon model of 
deregulation, neglect of industry, and excessive liberalisation of the financial 
markets. In   2010   therefore,   the   Commission   launched   a   ‘fresh   approach’   to  
industrial policy for the EU (EC 2010). A strong motivating factor has been the 
eastward shift in economic power to the new emerging economies in East 
Asia and the rise of the BRIC economies led by China. This has led to the 
realisation that in order to enhance the global competitive position of the EU, 
there is a need for a EU-level industrial policy, which would create globally 
competitive European industries and European champions to compete 
against the rising powerhouses of China, India and the other emerging 
economies. While horizontal policies might continue to be needed to ensure 
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the cohesion of the Single Market within the EU, the challenge of competition 
from without the EU has refocused minds on the need for sectoral policies 
that would enable the EU to meet the challenge of the rapidly changing global 
economic architecture, and find its own niche in the global economy as a 
significant player. 
 
Consequently, in addition to improving existing horizontal measures, in its 
‘fresh’   industrial   policy   the   Commission   now   called   for   a   sector-specific 
dimension, identifying specific sectors for development at a European level 
such as space technology, clean and energy efficient motor vehicles, transport 
equipment, healthcare, environmental goods, energy supply industries, 
security industries, chemicals, engineering, transport-equipment, agro-food 
and business services.14 Measures to support these industries are to focus on 
promoting innovation, understood to include business and organisational 
innovations. The new industrial policy draws on the provisions of the Lisbon 
Treaty in particular Article 173 TFEU on industrial policy. As part of the 
Europe 2020 strategy the Commission will now regularly report  on  the  EU’s  
and Member States industrial policies, organised through the 
Competitiveness Council and the European Parliament. 
 
The new emphasis on sectoral industrial policy should be seen in the context 
of increased global competition, and the inexorable shift of economic power 
to the BRICS and East Asian countries since the recovery from the global 
economic crisis began in 2010. Europe needs to compete on a global market in 
a world in which competitor nations are engaged in active policies to support                                                         14 The	  Commission	  website	   summarising	   EU	   legislation	   states	   that	   “The Community industrial policy combines a horizontal approach, aimed at ensuring cohesion and synergy among the various strategic sectors, with a sectoral approach, allowing the specific characteristics of the various sectors to be taken into account”,  http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enterprise/industry/n26109_en.htm 
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their own industrial champions, despite WTO strictures against unfair 
competition. Thus the EU dimension of the new industrial policy is 
emphasised. The horizontal approach is still relevant as regards national 
industrial policies so as to prevent unfair competition within the EU, and to 
ensure a level playing field on the EU Single Market. Indeed it is enshrined in 
the Treaty of Lisbon. But in relation to global competitors, the EU now 
proposes to support Industrial policy cooperation among EU countries in the 
designated target industries.  
 
The new European industrial champions are to be based around advanced 
technologies and employ highly qualified workers. The question for the 
countries of South East Europe is to what extent they will be able to 
participate in this new world of super-advanced industrial development. 
How far will they be able to contribute to cooperative ventures to develop 
space technology, clean motor vehicles, nanotechnologies, and bio-
engineering innovations? Given the well known deficiencies in the 
technological level and skills base in these countries and the reduction in 
support to leading industry sectors in relation to EU accession and 
integration, it seems highly likely that the countries of SEE will be shut out of 
this new game altogether, while at the same time being prevented by the EU 
horizontal approach and by EU competition rules from applying a sectoral 
industrial policy of their own to drive the exit strategy out of economic 
recession and stagnation.  
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8.   Conclusion 
 
Despite the slow initial pace of transition in South East Europe and the 
widespread use of state aids to industry to support vertical industrial policies 
in the 1990s, with the onset of a faster pace of EU integration in the 2000s the 
pro-competition horizontal industrial policies of the EU have been adopted in 
almost all countries of the region. In various forms, industrial policies in 
South East Europe have followed the pattern of industrial policies in the EU 
which have evolved from a reliance on subsidising national champions in the 
early post-war years, towards an emphasis on horizontal measures to support 
the Single Market and the catching up of less developed regions. Industrial 
policy in South East Europe has been subject to a similar process of 
Europeanisation   as   has   been   observed   in   other   policy   areas.   In   the   region’s  
new member states, state aid to industry was rapidly reduced in the run up to 
accession, and a  similar process took place in the candidate and potential 
candidate states. A horizontal approach to industrial policy has replaced the 
previous reliance on more direct vertical forms of industrial policy that was 
designed to support key industries and preserve employment in large firms. 
These new industrial policies have been designed to support SMEs, develop 
technology parks, local industrial clusters, and promote the transfer of 
knowledge from the universities and research institutes to the business sector. 
The new horizontal approach has not however provided a strong basis for 
post-crisis recovery.  
 
Considering the data on the index of industrial production, in the case of the 
new member states, both Bulgaria and Slovenia expanded industrial 
production in the pre-accession years and beyond up to the economic crisis 
period, but have experienced a slow down since then. In the case of the 
Will Bartlett 
   38 
candidate states, both Croatia and Macedonia experienced strong growth of 
industrial production before the crisis but collapse or stagnation thereafter. In 
the case of the potential members, both Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia had 
experienced some industrial recovery of industrial production prior to the 
crisis but has not been able to match this since and industrial production has 
stagnated. In Montenegro, neoliberal policies adopted in the early 2000s had 
undermined the industrial sector and the crisis has only continued that 
process. In no countries apart from Romania has the adoption of the new 
horizontal industrial policies, at different points of time in different countries, 
been able to support a post-crisis recovery of industrial production. The 
Romanian case appears to be exceptional, driven as it has been by low value-
added production in the motor vehicle production sector, dependent on 
outside investment rather than indigenous recovery of the high growth high 
technology SMEs promoted by the horizontal policies.   
 
However, as argued above, the industrial policy of the EU is not a fixed 
arrangement. It has been the outcome of intense differences of opinion over 
the appropriate policy to adopt. The main industrial countries, especially 
France and Germany, have persisted in efforts to lobby for policies that would 
be more supportive of specific industrial sectors such as chemicals. Until the 
onset of the global economic crisis these lobbying efforts were largely 
unsuccessful and the pro-competitive orientation of Member States such as 
the UK predominated in ensuring a deepening of the horizontal and 
decentralised approach to industrial policy that became embedded in EU 
competition laws and in laws prohibiting direct state aids to industry that 
would distort competition.  
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All this has changed with the onset of the global economic crisis since 2008 
and its subsequent evolution into a crisis of the eurozone. German influence 
has become stronger, and the shift of global economic power to the emerging 
economies has made the EU much more concerned about its international 
competitive position. This sharpening of focus has brought vertical industrial 
policies, applied at the European level, back onto the agenda. As shown in 
Section 7 above, while the requirements for competition and horizontal 
policies remain in place, a new space has opened up for the use of various 
measures to support industrial champions at the EU level, in industries as 
varied as space technology, clean and energy-efficient motor vehicles, 
transport equipment, healthcare, environmental goods, energy supply 
industries, security industries, chemicals, engineering, transport-equipment, 
agro-food and business services. One of the common characteristics of these 
industries   in   the   form  envisaged   in   the   ‘fresh’   approach   to   industrial  policy  
championed by the European Commission is the focus on advanced 
technologies and the application of highly skilled labour.  
 
The challenge facing the countries of South East Europe wishing to follow this 
“high  path”  to  industrial  renaissance  will  be  to  engage  with  this  new  agenda,  
and make a significant contribution to the new industrial sectors at the 
European level. Unfortunately, the SEE countries are no longer able to 
contribute to the high technology industries that this approach targets 
because their industrial capacity has been diminished by the long years of 
transitional recession, and undermined by the horizontal industrial policy 
that they have been obliged to implement as a condition of the EU accession 
process. Reversing this will involve extensive industrial upgrading and 
adoption of new technologies in targeted industries within the group of 
sectors identified by the European Commission as the future industrial 
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champions of the EU. In the absence of such engagement, the economies of 
the region will be held back from involvement in the leading sectors of 
European   industry,   and   will   be   effectively   “shut   out”   of   the   EU’s   fresh  
approach to industrial policy.  
 
The alternative for the SEE countries seems to be to manoeuvre as best as 
possible within the constraints of EU competition policy to ensure that the 
adopted horizontal measures and decentralised industrial policies at local and 
regional level are well supported by the central government, and to make best 
use   of   EU   assistance   and   funding   opportunities.   This   “low  path”   industrial  
policy requires effective fiscal decentralisation to provide local authorities 
with sufficient funds to meet the challenges of local economic development, 
ensuring effective ministerial coordination and effective partnership between 
local administrations and business organisations at the local level, an 
orientation that is still to be developed in most countries in the region. 
 
Future research investigating the causes of differences in industrial sector 
performance in the SEE countries should be based on detailed case studies to 
assess the effects of different types of industrial policies on industrial 
performance. The research should identify the extent to which the countries of 
the   region   have   followed   the   “high   path”   of   technological   upgrading   or  
continue  with   the  “low  path”  of   cost-based competition on the basis of low 
value-added industrial development. A combination of methods should be 
used for such a research design, including a shift-share analysis of changes in 
the industrial structure to identify the nature of structural change, and 
identify sectors and industries that are experiencing the most significant 
growth in each country. This should be backed up by a set of in-depth local 
case studies in each country to identify the extent to which local companies 
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have managed to link in to the European value chains in the sectors such as 
clean and energy-efficient motor vehicles, transport equipment, healthcare, 
environmental goods, energy supply industries, security industries, 
chemicals, engineering, transport-equipment, agro-food and business services 
which are the focus of the EU industrial policy approach. One important 
policy that could help companies in the region to link in to these value chains 
is the now rather widespread development of tax-privileged industrial zones, 
for example in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and in Serbia. 
Case studies should be carried out in a number of these zones to investigate 
the extent to which they may provide support for a technology upgrading 
strategy linking local and EU high technology companies in a new wave of 
industrial development in the region. Factors contributing to the success or 
failure of these new initiatives should be identified and best practice examples 
identified to provide a guide to the policy makers involved in designing 
effective industrial policies to support future economic growth in the 
Europe’s  less  developed South East region. 
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